What makes a screening program ethical? by Braunack-Mayer, Annette J
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Social Sciences - Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
2006 
What makes a screening program ethical? 
Annette J. Braunack-Mayer 
University of Wollongong, abmayer@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers 
 Part of the Education Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Braunack-Mayer, Annette J., "What makes a screening program ethical?" (2006). Faculty of Social 
Sciences - Papers. 3742. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers/3742 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
What makes a screening program ethical? 
Abstract 
Ethics, as a discipline, asks "is this decision, situation, program or policy good? Under what 
circumstances is it good? Why?". This paper applies these questions to screening: "Is screening good? 
Under what circumstances is it good? Why is it good?". Of course, the answer to these questions depends 
on how one defines "good". A consequentialist, for instance, will suggest that a screening program is 
good when it prevents or, at least, reduces harm and suffering1 whereas non-consequentialists are likely 
to take a rather different approach. In this short paper, I have room only to skate across the surface of 
these arguments. I will suggest that there are at least two, rather different, sets of responses to the 
questions above and I will investigate the detail of two of these. The first response states that screening 
programs are good when they prevent harm and suffering; the second suggests that screening programs 
are worthwhile because they enhance autonomous decision making. 
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Introduction
Ethics, as a discipline, asks “is this decision, situation, 
program or policy good? Under what circumstances is 
it good? Why?”. This paper applies these questions to 
screening: “Is screening good? Under what circumstances 
is it good? Why is it good?”. Of course, the answer to 
these questions depends on how one defines “good”.  A 
consequentialist, for instance, will suggest that a screening 
program is good when it prevents or, at least, reduces harm 
and suffering1 whereas non-consequentialists are likely to 
take a rather different approach. In this short paper, I have 
room only to skate across the surface of these arguments. I 
will suggest that there are at least two, rather different, sets 
of responses to the questions above and I will investigate the 
detail of two of these. The first response states that screening 
programs are good when they prevent harm and suffering; 
the second suggests that screening programs are worthwhile 
because they enhance autonomous decision making.
Screening to prevent harm and suffering
There is a wide range of guidance available to help determine 
if a screening program is likely to be able to prevent harm 
and suffering. Such guidance includes Wilson and Jungner’s 
10 principles for mass screening programs (see Table 1), 
which are still cited today when population screening 
programs are proposed and evaluated.2  The principles 
provide a set of straightforward guidelines for screening. The 
principles are grounded in assessments of the importance 
of the health problem and the availability and acceptability 
of screening tools and treatment for the health problem. The 
principles are also grounded in the scientific understanding 
of the condition and a favourable economic balance between 
the costs and benefits of screening.
Each of these principles invites questions, and it is here 
that the task of ethically evaluating a screening program 
really begins.  For example, Wilson and Jungner state that 
the condition must be an important health problem, judged 
on the basis of prevalence and seriousness. Candidates for 
screening programs are more important if their conditions 
are either prevalent, serious, or both. For example, diabetes, 
particularly of a mild degree, is an example of a highly 
prevalent condition; phenylketonia (PKU), on the other hand, 
is extremely uncommon, but has very serious consequences 
if not treated early in life; whilst cervical cancer is an 
example of a condition that is both prevalent and serious.2  
Judgements about seriousness and prevalence are not 
simple objective measures; they are grounded in specific 
social, political and cultural contexts. Thus, decisions about 
which diseases to screen for reflect beliefs about whose 
SENSITIVITY, SPECIFICITY AND 
ALL THAT SCREENING JARGON
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Sensitivity and specificity are the measures of a 
screening test against the “true” results. In other 
words population screening, which generally 
uses relatively simple tests so that they can be 
conveniently used by a large number of people, can 
only ever provide an incomplete version of the true 
results.
In population screening there are four groups which 
result from the screening process; two groups 
which benefit from the test and two which receive 
unhelpful information. There are those people 
who are correctly identified as having the disease 
after being screened. They are well served by the 
screening process and receive important health 
information (the truly diseased group). Those who are 
correctly identified as not having the disease, have 
their faith in their own good health supported (the 
truly healthy group). The other two groups are not as 
well served by the screening process. They are those 
who return a positive screening test but do not have 
the disease (the false alarm group) and those who 
return a negative test but do have the disease (the 
missed group).
How well a screening test identifies the truly 
diseased group, while keeping the false alarm group 
as small as possible is called the positive predictive 
value of the screening test, and is broadly regarded 
as a measure of the efficiency of testing.
However, while a screening test may be efficient 
in terms of resources, it will fail if it does not have 
adequate sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity 
measures the size of the truly diseased group relative 
to the sum of the truly diseased and missed groups. 
A test which misses a lot of people will thus have 
poor sensitivity and will be avoided in screening 
programs. Specificity measures the size of the truly 
healthy group relative to the sum of the truly healthy 
and false alarm groups. Once again, a test which 
gives many people false alarms will be rejected as a 
screening test.
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populations, will have false positive rates of the order 
of 10%.6 The impact of learning that one has a sexually 
transmitted, life-long, incurable condition, particularly if 
one has no symptoms, is likely to be profound. An ethical 
assessment of a screening program needs to build an 
awareness of these types of outcomes into any analysis.
Principle 3, in table 1, emphasises the point that screening 
must only occur if people found to have a condition are able 
to access the treatment they then need. How ”available” 
does treatment need to be for it to be ethically acceptable? 
Lippman, for example, notes that PKU testing is supported 
across the United States, in part because there is a well 
established and accepted diet for children diagnosed with 
PKU.7  However, in only four states are health insurers 
required to cover the costs of the special foods that children 
with PKU need. Closer to home, one might argue that 
screening for diabetic retinopathy amongst indigenous 
people is only worthwhile if we are prepared to provide the 
culturally accessible and appropriate services that will be 
needed to make a difference to those with the condition.
One could go on, examining each of the principles and 
identifying and analysing the extent to which population 
benefits result from screening. As noted in the introduction, 
the underpinning ethical theory in this approach is 
consequentialist in orientation. However, some scholars 
writing about the ethics of screening have noted that there 
is a second set of arguments about the ethical acceptability 
of screening programs, which is not based on a preventive 
principle. These arguments focus instead on information 
and autonomy, suggesting that screening can be regarded 
as “good” because it enhances people’s capacity to make 
their own decisions about their own lives, and that this is a 
worthwhile aim in itself.8
Screening to promote individual autonomy
“Autonomy arguments” for screening are not grounded in 
the classic public health principle of benefit for the health of 
populations. Rather, they reflect an individualistic orientation 
by suggesting that, quite outside their role in preventing or 
reducing disease, screening programs can offer individuals the 
opportunity to take more control over their lives. Screening 
tests provide information, and information is a worthwhile aim 
in itself, regardless of the outcome.  Stone and Stewart go 
so far as to suggest that this “information” aim represents a 
“paradigm shift in the philosophy of screening”.8
Views such as these are typically found in debate about 
the ethical acceptability of prenatal screening.7 Prenatal 
screening is presented as an option that increases women’s 
reproductive choices and control. Much has been written 
about this issue and I will raise only three points. First, 
the information women have available to them when they 
make choices about reproduction is socially, historically and 
culturally determined. Only some conditions can be tested 
for; indeed, Lippman suggests, rather provocatively, that 
women have had little control over which conditions warrant 
screening tests at all. Instead, this has been determined 
by the geneticists who provide the tests, something, she 
problems matter most; screening newborns is deemed 
important, in part, because our society places the utmost 
importance on the health of newborns and children.
Principle 2, in table 1, directs our attention toward the 
outcomes of screening. The basic principle is that screening 
is only desirable when a better prognosis is given by 
identifying a condition, or its precursors, earlier. Clearly, 
screening for conditions for which there is no treatment 
available at all is hard to justify ethically. Usually, however, 
the problem facing the public health practitioner is more 
complex, as the evidence that screening “makes a 
difference” is not always available or may be difficult to 
collect. It is accepted practice that we ought not screen 
in the absence of evidence of effectiveness.3 However, 
if a screening program has become accepted practice in 
the absence of adequate evidence of its effectiveness, it 
would be difficult to discontinue such screening for this 
reason alone. For example, clinical examination of the hips 
of newborn infants is routinely performed as a screening 
test for developmental dysplasia of the hip, despite little 
firm evidence to support its value.4 However, as a Scottish 
health technology assessment report noted: “this screening 
has become such an accepted part of newborn health care 
that it would be almost impossible to discontinue it without 
compelling contradictory evidence”.5
Ethical analysis of the issues raised by principle 2 will also go 
beyond debate about the scientific evidence for screening 
and the need to consider other intended outcomes of 
screening. Screening tests give rise to false positives and 
negatives, and such events carry with them the potential for 
considerable anxiety and distress. For example, screening 
tests for herpes simplex virus 2, even in high prevalence 
Table 1: Principles of Early Disease Detection
1. The condition sought should be an important health problem.
2. There should be an accepted treatment for patients with 
recognized disease.
3. Facilities for diagnosis and treatment should be available.
4. There should be a recognizable latent or early 
symptomatic stage.
5. There should be a suitable test or examination.
6. The test should be acceptable to the population.
7. The natural history of the condition, including 
development from latent to declared disease, should be 
adequately understood.
8. There should be an agreed policy on whom to treat as 
patients.
9. The cost of case finding (including diagnosis and 
treatment of patients diagnosed) should be economically 
balanced in relation to possible expenditure on medical 
care as a whole.
10. Case-finding should be a continuing process and not a 
“once and for all” project.
Source: Wilson J, Jungner G. Principles and Practice of 
Screening for Disease. Geneva. World Health Organization. 1968.
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posits, that reflects “almost exclusively a white, middle 
class, perspective”.7
Second, the options available to women once they have test 
results are, in reality, quite limited. Their capacity to control 
their circumstances may be restricted to a simple decision 
about whether to continue with a pregnancy or not. One 
can imagine ways in which we might expand the available 
choices, for example, by ensuring that whatever diseases 
or conditions a child is born with will be treatable and/or 
manageable by available resources.7
Finally, even if we accept that there is a demand for 
information, particularly in the burgeoning realm of screening 
for genetic conditions, how much people actually understand 
about the conditions for which they may be screened is 
unclear. How well are people able to interpret information 
about genetic status, particularly if that information includes 
complex statements about risk and susceptibility to disease? If 
we are contemplating mass screening for genetic conditions, 
we need also to factor in the possibility that those who 
provide information about screening may not be competent to 
explain the nature of screening to their patients, or to answer 
questions before and after test results are available.8
Conclusion
The principles that guide screening have been well described 
for almost 40 years. For most of this period, ethical debate 
about the interpretation of these principles has focused 
on the extent to which screening programs can prevent 
or reduce the burden of disease.  More recently, some 
screening programs, particularly in prenatal and genetic 
testing, have been justified in terms of their capacity to 
enhance personal autonomy. This paper has suggested that 
neither the preventive nor the autonomy enhancing rationale 
can be taken at face value. In both cases, arguments about 
whether a screening program is, indeed, “good” will need 
to be made on a case by case basis, with careful attention to 
the circumstances and context of the individual program.
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Introduction
Across the world, terms like “inequalities”, “disparities” and 
“inequities” are often used interchangeably in academic and 
policy literatures.1 Even when they are defined, there seems 
little consensus about their meaning or measurement.2,3 
The rationale for this paper is to distinguish “inequity” 
from both “inequality” and “disparity” and to go on to 
highlight how we might measure and monitor the equity 
of healthcare provided to groups or populations. The paper 
is divided into two main sections. The first section focuses 
on the definition, measurement and monitoring of the 
equity of healthcare. The second section uses actual data 
on cervical screening rates in South Australia to highlight 
issues around the inequitable uptake of preventive services. 
Throughout both sections of the paper, we outline some of 
the suggested reasons for inequitable healthcare services 
and suggestions for future research.
Whilst much of the public health research literature on 
equity focuses on equity in health (i.e. in terms of morbidity, 
mortality, and proxies of illness/wellbeing using measures 
like quality adjusted life-years, disability adjusted life-
years, SF36, etc), this paper focuses attention on equity in 
healthcare.
The definition of healthcare used in this paper is fairly wide, 
and includes preventive services (e.g. cancer screening, 
women’s health clinics), treatments (e.g. prescribing), 
acute and chronic services, and services provided by a vast 
